Technology Transfer Agreements Block Exemption Regulation

Technology pools have some pro-competitive effects – they usually allow a “one-time” license of the technologies covered by the pool and can also contribute to the implementation of industry standards. However, they can also restrict competition: common licensing of pooled technology carries a risk of price cartel and pools can reduce innovation by excluding alternative technologies, making it more difficult for new and improved technologies to enter the market. Finland: Study on EU competition rules for technology agreements* On 12 August 2010, the Ministry of Employment and Economy published a report by the Finnish Competition Authority on the competition rules applicable to technology agreements. This report examines how the EU (…) This collective work, which took place on 21 September 2004 in Paris, is the latest testimony to the FNDE`s commitment to the Community competition rules applicable to technology transfer agreements. A convenient way to report on the debates that took place that day could (…) The scope of TT GMOs has been clarified to exclude all agreements covered by the block exemptions for research and development (R&D) agreements and specialisation agreements. As a result, the rules on competition derogations applicable to specialisation agreements and R&D agreements take precedence over TT GMOs. Specialisation agreements are concluded between undertakings in order to optimise production capacity by joint production between undertakings or by agreeing that one undertaking will cease to produce a given product in order to purchase it from the other. Settlement agreements are widely used in intellectual property disputes and do not involve, by default, technology transfer. However, settlement agreements may become relevant under GMO TT if, against payment from the licensor, the licensee agrees to a more restrictive transaction than it would otherwise have accepted. In practice, these clauses may result in a delay or limitation of the placing on the market of the product based on the controversial technology. In that case, the agreement should be assessed in accordance with GMO TT and its guidelines. The same applies to cross-licensing and non-challenge clauses contained in transaction agreements.

Since termination clauses of license agreements are common in many industries, such as pharmaceuticals. B, many licensors have reasons to change their contracts. In practice, licensors must weigh the benefits of the TT-GVO Safe Harbor against the potential harm caused by licensee`s litigation. However, it is not presumed that termination clauses or other excluded restrictions have anti-competitive effects. Instead, they must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the guidelines. For example, termination clauses that relate to free, obsolete or unused technologies do not have anti-competitive effects. . .

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